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Abstract
This Article compares the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Free
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB to the factors used in Lebron v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp. when determining whether a corporation is part of the
government (and consequently subject to government control and the
President’s removal powers). In Free Enterprise, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered factors to determine whether or not an agency is a self-regulatory
organization (an independent third party agency that is not subject to
government control). Under the Free Enterprise test, the Court held that
PCAOB was not an SRO (unlike the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
Inc.) because PCAOB is “part of the government.” Applying the Free
Enterprise analysis and the Lebron test to FINRA, FINRA is considered to be
an SRO and will remain safely nested like the tiniest matryoshka doll, away
from direct governmental oversight. This Article discusses in-depth the Free
Enterprise analysis, the Lebron test, and how FINRA does not pass the
scrutiny of either test to be considered “part of the government.” Therefore,
FINRA will remain unchecked by the government, leaving FINRA free from
scrutiny and without an obligation to be accountable to the public.
I. Introduction
In a 5–4 decision in June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
the dual requirements restricting the removal power of the U.S. President
shielded the members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”), and was in contravention of constitutional powers vested in the
President. 1 Specifically, the Court held that where the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) regulations governing the PCAOB act to
prevent the removal of PCAOB members except for good cause (“layer one”)
coupled with a restriction that an SEC Commissioner’s removal by the
President would be conditioned upon situations where a Commissioner’s
1.

See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010).
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“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” have resulted in a lack
of accountability to the President, (“layer two”) 2 the separation of powers has
been violated. While the Free Enterprise Court reasoned that the PCAOB is
“not accountable to the President” and the President is “not responsible for
the actions” of the PCAOB, 3 the Court concluded that “the President . . . must
have some “power of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be
responsible.” 4 Therefore, the two enumerated levels of removal restrictions
violated the President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. 5
Because Congress modeled the PCAOB after the structure of a selfregulatory organization (“SRO”), 6 the holding in Free Enterprise arguably
calls into question that very structure, specifically the SRO’s unfettered
powers of removal. 7 The Free Enterprise Court, in dicta, distinguished an SRO
from the PCAOB using a test formulated in Lebron v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp. , which examines whether a given entity is part of the federal
government. 8 Utilizing the test, the Free Enterprise Court found that an SRO
would not be considered a part of the government (i.e., under the control of
government), because the SRO is not a “Government-created, Governmentappointed entity, with expansive powers to govern an entire industry.” 9
Further, application of the Lebron test highlights what may be a
contradiction to the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Free Enterprise 10 with regard
to how courts applying Lebron would find governmental control over an entity,
where, as in Free Enterprise, the Court had already equated removal power with
the power of government to control such an entity, 11 not simply whether an entity
meets the three prongs of the Lebron test. Applying the Free Enterprise analysis
to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) or a similar
organization, the Lebron test would not be satisfied, thus the problematic
contradiction will persist. Therefore, FINRA will remain safely nested like the
tiniest matryoshka doll, away from direct governmental oversight. Until the
contradiction between the Free Enterprise analysis and the Lebron test can be
reconciled by a subsequent holding or legislation, FINRA’s dual layers of removal
restrictions guarantee oversight of FINRA will remain unchecked, leaving FINRA
free from scrutiny and without an obligation to be accountable to the public.

2. See id. at 3148.
3. Id. at 3148, 3153.
4. Id. at 3152 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926)).
5. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147.
6. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010).
7. See id.
8. See id. (citing Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995)).
9. See Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147 (quoting Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513
U.S. 374, 397 (1995)). Lebron holds that when “the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the
furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of
the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the government for purposes of the First
Amendment.” Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397.
10. See Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146.
11. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (1997) (removal is a powerful tool for control).
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II. Case Analysis: Free Enterprise Fund v. Public

Company Accounting Oversight Board

A. Constitutional Background
Article II Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states “[t]he executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,” and the
President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 12 To
faithfully execute the Laws, the Constitution implicitly provides for executive
officers to “assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his
trust.” 13 The Free Enterprise Court reiterated this principle, where Justice
Roberts, speaking for the Court, noted: “the Constitution has been understood
to empower the President to keep these officers accountable—by removing
them from office, if necessary.” 14 Importantly and without reexamining the
issue, the Free Enterprise Court equated control with the removal power. 15
Recognizing, however, that the President’s removal power is not
infinite, 16 the Free Enterprise Court touched on the already well-established
separation of powers principles. 17 Citing the earlier Supreme Court case
Humphrey's Executor, the Court in that case determined “that Congress can,
under certain circumstances, create independent agencies run by principal
officers appointed by the President, whom the President may not remove at
will but only for good cause.” 18 Specifically, the Court upheld a provision in
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act, which permitted removal of a FTC
commissioner by the President, but only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.” 19 There, only one single level of restrictive removal
power (the for-cause “layer one provision”), authorized by Congress over the
agency commissioner, would not act to contravene the President’s
constitutional duties. 20 Accordingly, the Free Enterprise case examined where
dual levels of restrictive removal powers butted up against well-established
precedent upholding the constitutionality of a single level of restrictive
removal power. 21
B. Majority

Free Enterprise ultimately illustrates a novel issue: where two layers

(as described above) of removal power with restriction are embedded in a
statutory scheme, what is the effect on the separation of powers doctrine? 22
U.S. CONS. Art. II, § 1, cl. 1; see also id. at § 3.
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146 (2010) (citing 30
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 334 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939) (emphasis added).
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664.
16. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935).
17. See Id.
18. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146 (citing to Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620).
19. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620.
20. See id. at 632.
21. See id.; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660–61 (1988); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S.
483, 485 (1886).
22. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010).
12.
13.
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The question addressed by the Free Enterprise Court was whether the
President could be “restricted in his ability to remove a principal officer, who
is in turn restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer, even though
that inferior officer determines the policy and enforces the laws of the United
States?” 23 The five-justice majority ultimately held that dual layers of
restrictive removal contravened the President’s constitutional duties. 24
At issue in Free Enterprise was the PCAOB, created under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”). 25
Sarbanes-Oxley regulations contain a series of heightened restrictions on the
accounting industry enforced via the PCAOB, a nonprofit corporation. 26 The
PCAOB governs “[e]very accounting firm—both foreign and domestic—that
participates in auditing public companies under the securities laws.” 27 Each
accounting firm must annually register, pay fees, and comply with all PCAOB
rules and regulations. 28 Additionally, the PCAOB enforces “securities laws,
the [SEC’s] rules, its own rules, and professional accounting standards.” 29
Specifically, the PCAOB “promulgates auditing and ethics standards,
performs routine inspections of all accounting firms, demands documents and
testimony, and initiates formal investigations and disciplinary proceedings.” 30
The PCAOB has the power to and “can issue severe sanctions in its
disciplinary proceedings, up to and including the permanent revocation of a
firm’s registration, a permanent ban on a person’s associating with any
registered firm, and money penalties.” 31 The broad swath of enforcement
responsibilities afforded the PCAOB is indicative of the tremendous power the
PCAOB may exercise over public company accountants and standards. 32
Significantly, Congress structured the PCAOB model after private
33
SROs such as FINRA. 34 However, the Free Enterprise Court expressed that
the PCAOB is fundamentally unlike an SRO because the PCAOB in fact,
satisfies the test formulated in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. 35
The Lebron test states that an entity is part of the government if it is a
“Government-created, Government-appointed entity, with expansive powers
to govern an entire industry.” 36 Although the statute creating the PCAOB
contained language stating that the PCAOB “shall not be an agency or
establishment of the United States Government” 37 and the Free Enterprise
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010) (citing SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, §§ 101(a), 102(a), (f), 103, 106(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), 7212(a), (f), 7213, 7216(a)(1)
(2006)).
29. Id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 105(b)(1), (c)(4), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7215(b)(1), (c)(4) (2006)).
30. Id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 103–105, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7213–7215 (2006 ed. and Supp. II)).
31. Id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 105(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4) (2006)).
32. See id.
33. An SRO supervises and regulates the actions of its members, and is subject to oversight by the SEC.
See Definition of Self-Regulatory Organization–SRO, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
sro.asp#axzz1kF3u1cK2 (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
34. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010).
35. Id. (quoting Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995)).
36. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147.
37. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (2006).
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parties agreed that PCAOB members are “not Government officials for
statutory purposes,” the parties were able to agree that the PCAOB is “part
of the Government” for constitutional purposes and thus will be subject to
constitutional protections and vested powers of the other branches of
government. 38 The PCAOB’s structure consists of five members appointed by
the SEC, each serving alternating five-year terms. 39 Under the existing
structure, PCAOB members are “substantially insulated from the [SEC’s]
control” 40 because the regulations state that the SEC can only remove PCAOB
members “for good cause shown.” 41 In order to show good cause for removal,
the SEC must determine that a PCAOB member either (i) wilfully violated
any provision of [the Sarbanes–Oxley] Act, the rules of the Board, or the
securities laws; (ii) has wilfully abused the authority of that member; or (iii)
without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce compliance
with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard by any
registered public accounting firm or any associated person thereof. 42
Further, the removal process of a PCAOB member requires an “on the
record” determination “after notice and opportunity for a hearing,” is afforded
to the member. 43 The “[r]emoval of a [PCAOB] Board member requires a
formal [SEC] Commission order and is subject to judicial review.” 44 Thus, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act “not only protects [PCAOB] Board members from removal
except for good cause , but withdraws from the President any decision on
whether that good cause exists.” 45 Because the decision rests solely with SEC
Commissioners themselves, the Free Enterprise majority argued, the PCAOB
as created is both “not accountable to the President and [conversely has] a
President who is not responsible for the Board.” 46
The majority therefore held that two regulatory layers allowing removal
are “contrary to [Article II-designated] vesting of the executive power in the
President.” 47 The majority further reasoned that because “[t]he President
cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee
the faithfulness of the officers who execute them,” and moreover “the
President cannot, [therefore], remove an officer who enjoys more than one
level of good-cause protection, even if the President determines that the officer
is neglecting his duties or discharging them improperly. That judgment is
instead committed to another officer, who may or may not agree with the
President’s determination, and whom the President cannot remove simply
because that officer disagrees with him.” 48 This “limbo” status constructed by
the regulatory structure thereby contravenes the President’s “constitutional
obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.” 49
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148 (citing Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397).
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147.
Id. at 3148 (emphasis added).

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(e)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2006) (emphasis added).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 107(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3) (2006).
Id. at § 7217(d)(2).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (2010).
Id. at 3153 (emphasis added).

Id.
Id. at 3154.
Id. (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988)).
Id. at 3154.
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The majority grounds their holding in the principle that a contradiction
exists where the regulations, as structured, prevent the PCAOB from being
accountable to the President, a concept that directly opposes the separation
of powers principles embedded in the Constitution. 50 The majority maintains
that the Framers of the Constitution wanted “those who are employed in the
execution of the law [to] be in their proper situation, and the chain of
dependence be preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the
highest, will depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on
the community.” 51
In conclusion, the majority found that the two layers of restrictive
removal (“for cause” and “intentional malfeasance”) contravened the
President’s constitutional duty and severed the provision from the SarbanesOxley Act, thereby permitting the at will removal of PCAOB members. 52
C. Dissent
Converse to the majority, the four dissenters argued that the PCAOB,
created under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, does not “significantly” impede the
President’s constitutional power and to hold otherwise “disrupts severely the
fair and efficient administration of the laws.” 53 Associate Justice Breyer
observed that the majority’s rigid view and bright line approach to Congress’
ability to limit the President’s removal power deprives the government of
flexibility. 54 The dissenting judges aspired to soften the seemingly inflexible
underpinnings of the traditional constitutional separation of powers analysis
and leave room for a more functional approach thereby permitting
flexibility. 55 Furthermore, they argued that following precedent would
actually better embody the concept of a “workable government.” 56 The Free
Enterprise dissenters did not rely on any specific text within the
Constitution 57 and maintained that the Constitution’s broad language allows
for government expansion. 58 Specifically, the Supreme Court has previously
held that:
[the Constitution’s] framework has been sufficiently flexible over the past two
centuries to allow for enormous changes in the nature of government. The Federal
Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the
Framers . . . Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the

50. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010).
51. See id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463, 499 (1789) (J. Madison)).
52. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 3164–65.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 3170.
56. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3167 (2010) (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1932) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see also
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–90 (1988) (substance over form); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854 (1986) (functional approach over rigid approach); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53 (1932) (substance over form).
57. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3166 (noting that the U.S. Constitution is silent on removal
power).
58. See id. at 3168 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)).
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Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of
the Federal Government's role. 59

They found that the broad language of the Constitution allows for a workable
government through the utilization of administrative agencies. 60
Consequently, the Free Enterprise dissenters contend that since a flexible
government is set out in precedence, and an efficient Government is a flexible
government, precedence commands a flexible and more functionalist view of
the PCAOB. 61 Particularly, the dissenters relied on one previous decision,
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, that insisted “when ‘determining
whether [an] Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate
branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.’” 62 Accordingly, the dissent used a balancing approach and argued
that the second layer of removal restrictions placed on the PCAOB members
does not significantly affect the President’s power. 63 They offered four
examples to illustrate their approach:
1. The President and the Commission both want to keep a Board member in
office. Neither layer is relevant.
2. The President and the Commission both want to dismiss a Board member.
Layer Two stops them both from doing so without cause. The President's
ability to remove the Commission [Layer One] is irrelevant, for he and the
Commission are in agreement.
3. The President wants to dismiss a Board member, but the Commission
wants to keep the member. Layer One allows the Commission to make
that determination notwithstanding the President's contrary view. Layer
Two is irrelevant because the Commission does not seek to remove the
Board member.
4. The President wants to keep a Board member, but the Commission wants
to dismiss the Board member. Here, Layer Two helps the President, for it
hinders the Commission's ability to dismiss a Board member whom the
President wants to keep in place. 64

Utilizing the four scenarios portrayed above, the dissenters concluded that
the removal of the second layer does not make the PCAOB any more
accountable to the President. 65 Therefore, the dissenters would tolerate
insignificant restrictions on the President’s power, to yield flexibility. 66
Further, the dissenters asserted that the Court should demonstrate
judicial restraint and not question the removal restriction placed on the
PCAOB. 67 The dissenters reasoned that the second layer does not significantly
restrict the President and by leaving layer two in place, the Court would help
59. New York, 505 U.S. at 157.
60. See id.
61. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164–65.
62. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3175 (2010) (citing 433
U.S. 425, 443 (1977)); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691, 695 (upholding a significant impediment on the
President’s power by balancing the impediment versus function of the official in question).
63. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3171.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 3170.
67. See id.
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to accomplish administrative flexibility. 68 The dissent added that the Court
should defer to Congress because the Court holds an inferior understanding
of the realities of administration. 69 In summation, the dissent’s rationale in
finding no flaw in the constitutionality of the application of the dual layers of
restrictive removal was ultimately to bolster a mechanism to insulate the
PCAOB from the political pressure surrounding the President, specifically
that the Board members do not have political affiliations and are simply
accounting experts trying to protect public company investors. 70
III. The Free Enterprise Decision and FINRA
A. FINRA Origins
In 1936, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”)
incorporated in the state of Delaware as a non-profit corporation. 71 In 1938,
Congress amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)
to allow for the formation and registration of national securities associations,
otherwise known as SROs. 72 After passage of the amendments, the NASD gained
authorization from Congress as a national securities association in 1939. 73 In
2007, the NASD and NYSE Group, Inc. combined forces to create one entity—
FINRA. 74
B. FINRA Responsibilities
FINRA is responsible for the regulation and oversight of all securities firms
that do business with the public, commonly known as broker-dealers. 75
Additionally, FINRA is in charge of the training and education of securities
professionals, including the testing and licensing of registered representatives. 76
Further, FINRA inspects securities firms, establishes compliance rules, and
enforces its rules in addition to the federal securities laws of the United States. 77
FINRA may also facilitate arbitration and mediation of complaints between

68. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3170 (2010).
69. See id. at 3169 (noting that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act passed by a vote of 423 to 3 in the House of
Representatives and by a unanimous vote in the Senate).
70. See id. at 3174 (noting that the PCAOB is not appropriated money from Congress evinces Congress’
recognition for the need to insulate the PCAOB from political pressure).
71. Entity Details of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc., DEL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
https://delecorp.delaware.gov/tin/controller (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
72. See The Maloney Act of 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified at Exchange Act § 15A, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3 (1988)) (generally known as § 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
73. In re Application by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., for Registration as a National
Securities Association, Exchange Act Release No. 34,2211, 5 S.E.C. 627 (promulgated Aug. 7,1939).
74. Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement Governance and Related Changes to
Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory, Exchange Act Release No. 34,56145, 91
S.E.C. Docket 517 (July 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-56145.pdf.
75. See About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
76. See id.
77. See id.
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investors (customers) and broker dealers. 78 Finally, FINRA monitors securities
trading on the U.S. stock markets. 79
C. FINRA Framework
A Board of Governors controls FINRA. 80 The FINRA bylaws state that
the Board of Governors must consist of FINRA’s Chief Executive Officer, the
Chief Executive Officer of NYSE Regulation, eleven Public Governors, and ten
Industry Governors. 81
The registered FINRA companies (i.e., “broker-dealers”) elect seven of
the ten industry Governors. 82 The three additional Industry Governors round
out diversity on the Board and include a Governor associated with a floor
member of the New York Stock Exchange, one Governor associated with an
independent financial planning registered firm or an affiliate of an insurance
company, and one Governor associated with an affiliated Investment
Company. 83 The Board of Governors appoints these three Industry Governors
from candidates chosen by the Nominating Committee. 84
Further, the Board of Governors appoints FINRA’s eleven Public
Governors from candidate recommendations via the Nominating Committee. 85
The Nominating Committee is comprised of certain members from the Board
of Governors and is annually appointed by the remaining Board of
Governors. 86 Finally, the SEC can only remove a Governor on the Board after
appropriate notice, opportunity for a hearing, and for cause. 87
D. Is FINRA Exempt From the Free Enterprise Decision?

1. Is FINRA a Part of the Federal Government?
As mentioned above, the Free Enterprise majority specifically points
out that an SRO is not part of the government because an SRO does not meet
the elements of the Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. test. 88 In
Lebron, the Court held that the test for whether a corporation is part of the
government is if the “Government creates a corporation by special law, for the
furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See The Maloney Act of 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified at Exchange Act § 15A, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3 (1988)).
81. By-Laws of the Corporation Article VII, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?
rbid=2403&element_id=4598 (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
82. See id. at Article I(z), Article I(dd), Article I(xx) (defining Small Firm Governor, Mid-Size Firm
Governor, and Large-Firm Governor), and Article VII, Section 4(a).
83. See The Maloney Act of 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified at Exchange Act § 15A, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3 (1988)).
84. See id.
85. See FINRA By-Laws, supra note 81, art. VII, § 9.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010).
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authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation.” 89 Under
a Lebron analysis, FINRA would not be a part of the Government.
The Lebron test is comprised of the following three elements: “the
entity must be created by the Government, must be appointed by the
Government, and must possess powers to govern an industry.” 90
The first Lebron element arguably is not satisfied under an initial
reading of the language “Government created by special law” 91 because a
federal statute did not create FINRA; instead it is a corporation authorized as
a national securities association under the Exchange Act. 92 Merriam-Webster
defines “create” as “to bring into existence.” 93 Although the government did
not expressly create FINRA by statute, 94 Congress ultimately recognized
FINRA as a national securities association, 95 indicating that the government
played a part in bringing FINRA into complete existence. 96 For FINRA to
satisfy Lebron element one, the element of “Government created by special
law” would have to be expanded from statutorily created entities, to also
include statutorily authorized entities.
FINRA satisfies the second element under Lebron, “the furtherance of
governmental objectives.” 97 The SEC and FINRA’s shared mission is “to
protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate
capital formation.” 98 FINRA, inter alia, registers and educates securities
industry participants, examines securities firms, writes rules, enforces rules
and the federal securities laws, informs and educates investors, and provides
arbitration for investors and registered broker-dealers. 99 According to the
SEC’s website, the SEC’s power includes, inter alia , “the power to register,
regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing agencies
as well as the nation’s securities self-regulatory organizations (SROs),” like
FINRA. 100 Clearly, FINRA’s aims advance U.S. governmental objectives
because they are substantially similar to the objectives expounded by the
SEC.
At first blush, the third and final element under Lebron, the
government’s “authority to appoint a majority of [the entity’s] directors,” is
not satisfied by FINRA because 101 the federal government has no active part
89. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 399 (1995).
90. Id. at 397 (holding that “the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance
of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors
of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment”).
91. Id.
92. See Entity Details, supra note 71.
93. Create, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/create
(last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
94. See Entity Details, supra note 71; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry SelfRegulatory Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 159 (2008)
(discussing that FINRA, formerly known as the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., was
incorporated in Delaware in 1936).
95. See Karmel, supra note 94.
96. See id. at 157.
97. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 399 (1995).
98. What We Do, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml, (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
99.
See In re Application by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., for Registration as a
National Securities Association, Exchange Act Release No. 34,2211, 5 S.E.C. 627 (promulgated Aug. 7,1939).
100. See Karmel, supra note 94, at 157.
101. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399.
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in the appointment of the FINRA Board of Governors. 102 However, the SEC
has ultimate approval power over any change in FINRA’s bylaws. 103
Therefore, the government (the SEC) must approve the rules outlining the
appointment of the Board of Governors and the appointment of the
Nominating Committee thereby satisfying the third element of Lebron. 104
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has equated removal power with the
power to control, 105 but the Lebron analysis seems to indicate that
appointment power may also serve as an element indicating federal
government control. 106 This discrepancy is in need of clarification. Implied in
the third element of Lebron is the concept that the power to control stems
from the power to appoint. 107 However, the Supreme Court’s Free Enterprise
decision held that control is removal power without reference to any other
elements that would signify control. 108 By implication, a viable argument
exists that the ultimate test for who controls an entity lies in the answer to
who holds the power to destroy the same entity. Accordingly, because the SEC
retains the power to remove FINRA’s Board of Governors and the federal
government retains no power to destroy FINRA, the Free Enterprise holding
would support the conclusion that the SEC is in control. 109 Because of the
seeming inconsistency in the Free Enterprise holding and the tenets of the
Lebron test, for FINRA to satisfy element three of Lebron, the element would
have to be expanded to include removal power, or the Supreme Court would
need to recognize and give considerable weight to the fact that the SEC has
final approval over the appointment guidelines of the FINRA Board of
Governors suggesting the requisite level of governmental control.
To conclude, the Lebron analysis as applied to FINRA, FINRA would
not have existed as an SRO without the approval of Congress. 110 Furthermore,
the appointment procedures of FINRA’s Board of Governors as outlined in
FINRA’s By-Laws would not have existed without the SEC’s approval. 111
Although the above analysis is not narrowly tailored to the holding in Lebron,
the preceding discussion may be viable arguments to expand the Lebron
holding.

2. Would the Removal Process of FINRA’s Board of Governors
Contravene the President’s Constitutional Power?
Assuming that an expansion of element three of the Lebron holding is
persuasive and arguments that FINRA is part of the Government are
102. See The Maloney Act of 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified at Exchange Act § 15A, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3 (1988)) (generally known as § 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
103. See By-Laws of the Corporation, art. XI, § 1, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_m
ain.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4661 (last visited Jan. 28, 2011); see also Karmel, supra note 94, at 157.
104. See FINRA By-Laws, art. XI, § 1.
105. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) (citing
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (1997)).
106. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 399 (1995).
107. See id.
108. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162 (citing Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664).
109. See FINRA By-Laws, art. IX.
110. See Securities and Exchange Act § 19(h)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(4) (2006).
111. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399.
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convincing, the next step in the analysis would be to determine whether or
not the removal of FINRA’s Board of Governors violates the separation of
powers doctrine, similar to the PCAOB conundrum in Free Enterprise.
Under the Free Enterprise analysis, FINRA’s dual layered removal process
contravenes the President’s constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the
laws.
The first layer of removal power regards the removal of SEC
Commissioners. Such removal is not express in statute, still, the Free
Enterprise majority assumes, and both parties stipulated, that the removal
power is for cause, specifically, “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office.” 112 As mentioned above, the dissent questioned such assumption and
provided a thorough opposing argument, which centered around an analysis
of the historical context and incorporated Congress’ intent to create the
SEC. 113 The dissent warned that the majority should be wary when assuming
a “for cause” provision in order to strike down another statute because based
on Congress’ intent (i.e., the President’s removal power of the SEC
Commissioners could very well be at will and not for cause.) 114 If SEC
Commissioners are removable at will, there remains only one layer of
restrictive removal protecting the PCAOB. Thus, the President’s
constitutional duty is not usurped because one layer of restrictive removal has
firm precedence as being found constitutional. 115 Because the SEC cannot
remove a FINRA Governor unless the Governor has willfully violated the
statute, abused his or her authority, or “failed to enforce compliance without
a reasonable justification or excuse, the process to remove FINRA Governors
would be, arguably, very strict under the Free Enterprise analysis.” 116
Therefore, the SEC’s “for cause” removal, layered on top of FINRA’s
“for cause removal,” would violate the separation of powers doctrine,
presumably for the same reasons as the majority cited regarding the PCAOB
in Free Enterprise—the dual layer scheme indicates control, thus violating
implicit constitutional powers. Further, in light of the Free Enterprise
dissent’s historical argument regarding whether the SEC Commissioners are
removable for cause or at will, 117 it would be crucial for such question to be
researched and clarified to avoid confusion and miscategorization of entities
going forward. However, does the contention that FINRA is not governmentcreated and the government does not appoint the FINRA Governors save the
removal process from the stamp of unconstitutionality under the Free
Enterprise decision? The answer is yes until the Supreme Court chooses, if
ever, to re-evaluate Lebron. Moreover, it is undeniable that five justices in the
Free Enterprise majority emphatically stated that an SRO is not “Government
created or Government appointed. 118 Nevertheless, the Court concedes that
112. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3144, 3183 (2010).
113. See id. at 3170.
114. Id. at 3182.
115. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935). However, regardless of the
removal of the SEC Commissioners, the dissent concluded that two layers of restrictive removal power
are constitutional because the second layer does not significantly restrict the President’s power and
provides for a flexible government. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3170 (2010).
118. See id.
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Congress designed the PCAOB after the SRO model and SRO statutes.
Therefore, logically, if the PCAOB is part of the government and the PCAOB
was designed using the SRO model, there is a strong argument in favor of
designating any SRO as part and parcel of the federal government.
IV. Expansion of Lebron v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp. to Include FINRA
A moralistic argument in favor of an expansion of the Lebron case can
be found in the massive economic and regulatory fallout following the last
several years of global economic downturn. FINRA and the SEC have both
suffered image and trustworthiness attacks after the lack of adequate
securities regulation unveiled by the loss of investors’ finances and trust in
such well-publicized cases as the Bernie Madoff and R. Allen Stanford fraudscandals. These scandals illustrate what some critics refer to as “both the broadest
and deepest criticism of FINRA: that FINRA has an inherent conflict-of-interest
because it is controlled by brokers, while also regulating brokers, thus rendering
FINRA an ineffective regulator.” 119 FINRA oversees the securities industry, but
FINRA is comprised of the leaders profiting from and driving the very same
securities industry, which begs the obvious question: is self-regulation the best
practice for securities regulation?120 Arguments against self-regulation include
that FINRA is an ineffective regulator because it tends to serve and protect
“brokers’ interests, rather than the public’s interest.” 121 One major critic
disavowing self-regulation, the non-governmental watchdog known as the
Project on Government Oversight, (“POGO”) 122 found FINRA to be failing at
its regulation of broker-dealers, subsequently suggesting that all securities
regulations should be “under the umbrella of the government, with no
independent regulator.” 123
However, there are advantages of classifying FINRA as part of the
federal government. First, historically the securities regulation field has been
criticized for its lack of transparency. 124 An egregious example of such lack of
diversity and transparency within the regulatory field involved the
appointment of Bernard “Bernie” Madoff’s (currently incarcerated for felony

Manuel P. Asensio & Daniel Rodriguez, Securities Regulatory Reform: Addressing FINRA’s Inherent
FOR ECON. STABILITY, 7 (Jan. 4, 2010), available at
www.asensio.com/FINRAReportweb.pdf (citing Richard Lindsey, . . . But Beware of ‘Moral Hazards’, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at A18).
120. Page Perry, LLC, Concerns Grow Over SRO Bill For Advisors, INV. FRAUD LAWYER BLOG (Dec. 14,
2011), http://www.investmentfraudlawyerblog.com/2011/12/concerns_grow_over_sro_bill_fo.html.
121. Asensio & Rodriguez, supra note 119, at 9.
122. About Us, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, http://www.pogo.org/about/about-us-history.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2012). The Project on Government Oversight is a “nonpartisan independent watchdog” based
in Washington, DC and funded by foundation grants and individuals. Id.
123. Shahien Nasiripour, Watchdog Group Warns Congress About Wall Street Oversight,
H UFFINGTON P OST , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/23/watchdog-group-warns-cong_n_4733
99.html (last updated Apr. 25, 2010).
124. See Complaint at n. 4, Amerivet Sec., Inc. v. FINRA, 2009 WL 7418040 (D.C. Super. Aug. 10, 2009.)
(No. 09CV05767); see also Barry James Dyke, You Must Be Kidding: Mary Shapiro a Sheriff on Wall Street,
ECON. WARRIOR (May 27, 2010. 9:36 AM), http://economicwarrior.org/2010/05/27/you-must-be-kidding-maryshapiro-a-sheriff-on-wall-street-what-are-the-editors-at-time-magazine-smoking/.
119.

Conflict and Moral Hazard, ALLIANCE

Vol. 1, Fall 2012

25

Global Markets Law Journal
securities fraud) 125 to the regulatory body that reviews FINRA’s disciplinary
action. 126 Concurrently, Madoff’s brother and niece both held positions at
FINRA. 127 The multiple familial connections certainly raise scrutiny and question
how any official, charged with the security and protection of strangers, could
effectively regulate their own family. 128
Despite past conflicts of interest, a lack of transparency still plagues FINRA
because many of FINRA’s executive leaders hail from the very same brokerdealers it is responsible for regulating. 129 Thus, the most compelling argument in
favor of classifying FINRA as an SRO is to ensure the agency is regulated
directly by the federal government. 130 Direct federal government oversight
authority will bolster public trust in FINRA, where FINRA will become less
likely to be perceived as making its own rules or satisfying the interests of
insiders ahead of the public. 131
V. Conclusion
In addition to seeking clarity and uniformity in court precedent, there
are good public policy reasons to implement an overhaul of the securities
regulators, including increasing transparency and accountability of all
regulators to all investors. However, unless the Lebron test is expanded,
neither the Lebron nor the Free Enterprise holdings will reach FINRA. In
order to reach FINRA as well as other such organizations, the Supreme Court
should expand Lebron’s test in two ways. First, element one can easily be
expanded to include government-approved entities, given that Congress
125. See Patricia Hurtado, Peter Madoff, Brother of Bernard Will Plead Guilty, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June
26, 2012. 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-27/peter-madoff-brother-of-bernard-will-pleadguilty-u-s-says.html.
126. See Complaint at n. 4, Amerivet Securities, Inc., 2009 WL 7418040.
127. See id.; see also Asensio & Rodriguez, supra note 119, at 9.
128. Similar conflicts of interest also existed between FINRA and Stanford Financial Group. Anna Driver,
Stanford Workers Had Ties to Regulator FINRA, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2009, 5:08 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51N5RO20090224 (discussing that a compliance officer at Stanford
Financial, Lena Stinson, held a position on FINRA’s membership committee and Stanford Group Holding’s
Chief Operation Officer, Frederick Fram, held a position on FINRA’s continuing education committee).
129. See Danielle Brian, POGO Letter to Congress Calling For Increased Oversight of Financial SelfRegulators, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/letters/financialoversight/er-fra-20100223-2.html (mentioning that the “cozy relationships” between FINRA and the securities
industry is a serious conflict of interest). The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) is a nonpartisan
independent watchdog that investigates corruption and other misconduct in order to achieve a more effective,
accountable, open, and ethical federal government. See id. POGO observed that the current FINRA Chief
Executive Officer, Richard Ketchum, “is a former General Counsel for the Corporate and Investment Bank at
Citigroup, Inc. Robert Errico, FINRA's Executive Vice President for Member Regulation, is a former Senior
Vice President for Capitals Market Oversight at Charles Schwab & Co., and a former General Counsel for
Schwab Capital Markets L.P. Susan Merrill, FINRA's Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement, is
a former partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell, which represents some of the largest financial institutions in the
world. And on FINRA's Board of Governors, many of the members that are supposed to represent the public's
interest have close ties to the securities industry.” See id. However, Robert Errico and Susan Merrill have
since stepped down from their positions, possibly because of the POGO findings. See FINRA Executives, FIN.
INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/Leadership/P019457 (last visited Jan. 21,
2011).
130. Furthermore, the fees from the broker-dealers fund FINRA; therefore, the brokerage firms provide
FINRA’s executive compensation. Hence, FINRA’s regulation of the broker-dealers provides a deterrent for
the FINRA executives to “bite the hand that feeds them.” Therefore, FINRA executives have a financial
incentive to place broker-dealers’ interest in front of the public’s. See Page Perry, LLC, supra note 120.
131. Id.
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already approves whether an entity becomes a national securities association.
Second, element two should be expanded to include organizations where
government has the power to remove directors of the entity, instead of the
current model which allows only for the government appointment of directors.
If the courts would instead interpret the power of removal to be on equal
footing with the power to control an entity, the federal government, through
the SEC, would then be deemed in control over FINRA (or like organizations)
regardless of who has actually appointed the entity’s Board of Governors. An
expansion of the Lebron test would force transparency and accountability to
investors (or other public beneficiaries) on the part of organizations like
FINRA.
The watchdog organization POGO has identified FINRA’s lack of
transparency or accountability to be a telltale sign highlighting the Court
and/or the legislature’s need to act, describing the organization as follows:
“[i]n light of FINRA’s abysmal track record” and because “[o]ur economy is too
important to be left in the hands of the very financial industry that brought us to
the brink of collapse,” 132 we advocate for a change. Therefore, if the above policy
reasons would be persuasive to the Supreme Court, reinterpretation of Lebron
allowing for the recategorization of FINRA as an SRO would accomplish the
desirable effect of fortifying both the public and investors’ faith alike in the
legitimacy of securities regulation thereby decreasing the opportunity for
catastrophic failures in oversight that might lead to future economic
disruption or missteps.

132.

Brian, supra note 129 (POGO Letter to Congress).
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